Pre-Merger struggles with the Communists - Lee Kuan Yew's Radio Broadcast

From Sept 1961, Lee Kuan Yew had a series of "fireside chats" broadcast on Radio. It was his attempt to explain and persuade fledgling "Singaporeans" (I do not know if we were legitimately or even customarily called that at the time) why we should seek Merger with Malaysia.

The links to these "fireside chats" (that is not their official name, but I believe LKY patterned the series of radio talks on FDR's) are attached, with the first few lines of the transcript included (in blue), and then my summary. (The audio recordings are listed here.)

There are 12 fireside chats here.

TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER'S FIRST BROADCAST OVER RADIO SINGAPORE ON WEDNESDAY, 13TH SEPTEMBER, 1961 AT 7.30 P.M.

Soon you will have to decide on your future. In the next few months we shall settle the constitutional arrangements for merger. In this series of broadcasts, I hope to tell you what merger means, why it is good for all of us, why it is coming, and why some people are deliberately creating trouble and difficulty over it to prevent it from taking place.

Everybody knows that merger is inevitable. The Tunku has said merger is inevitable. The PAP have also said that merger is inevitable. The Communists also admit that merger is inevitable. The inevitable is now happening. Some people can try to postpone the inevitable. But no one can stop it. The artificial division at the Causeway is a temporary one. It is only a matter of time before it is swept aside.

This opening broadcast covered the "conventional wisdom" that Merger was inevitable and necessary for the survival and success of Singapore; why Singapore wanted it, and why the Federation wanted it - SG for access to the hinterland that is Malaysia, and the Federation, to ensure that SG does not become the base from which the Federation is undermined by communists.

As security and defence would be under the central government in KL, this would curtail the activities and ambition of the Malayan Communist Party. As such, while they openly support Merger (to appear reasonable anti-colonial fighters), they actively sought to derail, delay, or dilute Merger for their own purpose.



SECOND BROADCAST TALK - (Sept 15, 1961)

Many of the urgent problems we face are related to the struggle for power of the Communist ideology by its supporters in Malaya. I shall have to talk to you about the nature of the challenge which the Communist system and the Communist party of Malaya are posing to us in terms which may never have been used before. For years since the beginning of the Emergency in 1948, Communism has been painted in terms of violence, terror, brutality and evil. There was violence, there was terror, there was brutality, and there were evil men. But that is not the whole story. For if it was as simple as that, the Communists would have died and perished with the collapse of their armed revolt. It is because, together with these weaknesses, they have some strong qualities that they have been able to survive in spite of the collapse of their armed revolt. 

LKY explained that the communist threat was real, and that his accounts would be based on his personal experience knowledge and not from official information from police or other secret files. The communists emerged from WWII as a fighting force, and this led to the Emergency of 1948. In those years, the emerging nationalists had their crucible of fire:

But we now began to understand the meaning of revolution in terms of life and blood, liberty and incarceration, hate and fear, love and comradeship. We have learned one important thing during the last decade: that only those count and matter, who have the strength and courage of their convictions to stick up and stand up for what they believe in, for their people, for their country, regardless of what happens to themselves. 

It was "a battle for the hearts and minds" of the people, and the activists too. 

TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER'S THIRD BROADCAST ON 18TH SEPTEMBER, 1961 AT 7.30 P.M.

My talk tonight is largely a personal narrative. It will explain how I came to know the Communists, what they are after in Malaya, who they are, how they operate, why we worked on parallel lines with them for many years and why eventually we have parted company over merger.

Let me take my story back to 1950 when I began to learn the realities of political life in Malaya. At that time every genuine nationalist who hated the British colonial system wanted freedom and independence. That was a time when only weak men and stooges came out and performed on the local political stage. Fierce men were silent or had gone underground to join the communists. There were the Progressive Party and their feeble leaders. There were the clowns of the Labour Party of Singapore. When I met acquaintances like Mr. Lim Kean Chye and Mr. John Eber and asked them what they were doing, why they were allowing these things to go on, they smiled and said "Ah well! What can be done in such a situation? "

One morning in January 1951 I woke up and read in the newspapers that Mr. John Eber had been arrested, that Mr. Lim Kean Chye had disappeared and escaped arrest. Shortly afterwards a reward was offered for his arrest. Politics in Malaya was a deadly serious business. These are not clowns or jokers. They had decided to go with Communists.

In this third broadcast, LKY narrates how his anti-colonial, anti-British objectives, being aligned to the Anti-British League's, and the Malayan Communist Party's objectives, brought him into contact with various figures in these two organisations who were either communists, or were leaning towards communism. He explained the methods of the communists, how the communists entrenched themselves in labour and political movements, and then were able to mobilise masses of people in popular support.

TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER'S FOURTH BROADCAST ON 20TH SEPTEMBER, 1961 AT 7.30 P.M.

Let me tell you tonight the inside story about the PAP and the people who made up the leadership. In 1954 when it was formed we the non-Communists were in complete control of the party. The only persons who would press the Communist point of view were Devan Nair, Fong Swee Suan, and Chan Chiaw Tor, 3 out of 12 members of the Central Executive Committee. After the election of the new Central Executive Committee in 1956, pro-Communist strength in the party had increased to 4 out of the 12 members. They were Lim Chin Siong, Devan Nair, Chia Ek Tian and Goh Boon Toh. At that time there was a sub-committee to redraft the constitution of the party. The Communists through James Puthucheary were pressing very hard for a constitution which would allow the branches complete control in the party and allow branch committees to nominate members to the Central Executive Committee. Such a constitution would in effect mean that the communists would be able to capture the party. For penetration of the branches of the party is a relatively easy matter as the  branches are open to everybody to join and participate in without serious checks. And from time to time these branches do come under Communist control and manipulation. Unfortunately for them while they were pressing to capture the party, they were also planning to capture the trade unions.

In the fourth broadcast, LKY narrated the early years of the PAP (founded 1954), and how the non-communists were in control of the Central Executive Committee (CEC). But of course the communists in the PAP were trying to gain control of the party.

This ended when there was a purge in 1956, and the communists were all detained.

But in 1957, using fake or "new" PAP members they captured 6 of the 12 CEC seats. But LKY and the non-communists declined to hold office, leaving the communists in the CEC to take over. (Subsequently, the Lim Yew Hock government arrested 5 of the 6 communists in the CEC.) When LKY regain control, he instituted a "cadre" system of membership to prevent the CEC from being captured by ordinary members.

Following the detention of the communists within the PAP, LKY visited them and when they were finally released, they all agreed to renounce the communist way. Except for Lim Chin Siong for whom LKY had doubts as to his true affiliations.

Subsequently, Lim broke with the PAP (covered in later broadcasts).

TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER'S FIFTH BROADCAST ON 22ND SEPTEMBER, 1961 AT 7.30 P.M.

There may be people who say that all this talk of the Communist underground is a fairy tale. I shall have to tell you something which is known to very few people.

In March, 1958, before I went with the All-Party Merdeka Mission to the London talks, someone whom I knew to be connected with the Communist organisation approached me and arranged for me to see a man who he said would like to see me and discuss some matters. I met him in Singapore one afternoon on the road between Victoria Memorial Hall and Legislative Assembly and took him to a room in the Legislative Assembly. He was a Chinese-educated young man several years younger than myself. An able and determined person. He told me that he was a representative of the Communist party in Singapore. I told him that I did not know who he was and I had no way of knowing the truth of his claim. He explained that his purpose in seeing me was to establish co-operation between the Communists and the non-Communists in the PAP.

You will remember that the Communists had been purged in 1956 and 1957. Some of them had given trouble to the PAP. He told me that they were all young and enthusiastic people who did not understand the Communist policy of united front, but that they meant well and wanted to help to bring about the Communist revolution in Malaya. He wanted to re-establish co-operation in the united anti-colonial front with the PAP. I shall call him the PLEN, short for plenipotentiary. We spoke in Chinese. Sometimes I used English words to clarify my meaning and I found that he understood English. I asked him for proof to show me that he was a genuine representative of the MCP. He smiled and said that I had to take his word for it. I then asked him whether he had authority over the open-front communist cadres in the unions and political parties and I gave as an example Chang Yuen Tong.

Chang was then a City Councillor and Executive Committee member of the Workers Party. He is now the President of the Electrical and Wireless Employees Union and is on the protem committee of the new Communist trade union united front, SATU. I knew he was one of the pro-Communist trade union workers. I told the PLEN that I thought the Communists were trying to make use of David Marshall's Workers Party to fight the PAP. They had used the Workers Party to fight us in the Jalan Besar Division in the City Council elections and they had lost on a close fight. I said that as evidence of his credentials that he was a real representative of the Communists Command in Singapore and his good faith in not wishing to attack the PAP by using the Workers Party as an instrument, he should give the word for the resignation of Chang Yuen Tong from the Workers Party and the City Council and let the Workers Party and David Marshall go on their own. He said "All right. Give us some time. We shall see that it is done."

Several weeks later in April 1958 while I was in London for the constitutional talks I read in the newspapers that Chang Yuen Tong had resigned from the Workers Party and from the City Council. The MCP had given orders. The PLEN had proved his credentials. Subsequently, in the City Council by- election at Kallang, David Marshall, without Communist support, and after all the foolish policies of his party in the City Council, found himself with just over one hundred votes at the end of a campaign in which he was most times talking to empty fields. The Communists had withdrawn support and the Workers Party collapsed.

This may be one of the more repeated anecdotes from LKY regarding the PLEN and his control over the MCP. The PLEN (and so the Chinese Communist Party) were keen to ally with LKY and the PAP to correct the missteps in 1956 and 1957, and sought to sell LKY on the idea of an anti-colonial alliance with the communists. However, LKY was of the view that the MCP would become the PAP's main rival in the future for the governance of Singapore.

TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER'S SIXTH BROADCAST OVER RADIO SINGAPORE ON MONDAY, 25TH SEPTEMBER, 1961, AT 7.30 P.M.

For some time before the Hong Lim by-election difficulties had been growing up between the Communists and us. It is not just Lim Chin Siong, for he only represents one aspect of open-front Communist activities.

For the first year after we took office from 1959-1960 there was sweet reasonableness. Lim was trying to find his way back into the fold of the Party. He was probably hoping he would be accepted back as an official in the Executive Committee of the P.A.P. and from such a position influence the party policy. But he did not get this. On the very day of his release from prison of 5th June, 1959, Lim, Devan Nair, Woodhull, Fong Swee Suan, James Puthucheary and Chan Chiaw Tor met the Central Executive Committee at P.A.P. HQ, South Bridge Road. There in the presence of all of them I told the Central Executive Committee that from my monthly and sometimes fortnightly discussions with all of them in Changi camp over 2 1/2 years I was prepared to accept the good faith of all the others who signed the declaration. I said I could not vouch for Lim Chin Siong's sincerity. So right from the start he knew that we wanted him to prove his sincerity and good faith.

The PAP came into power with the 1959 General Election, and the detainees from 1957 purge were released as mentioned in the extract above. LKY was not convinced of Lim Chin Siong's sincerity. But the new govt took a chance with the ex-detainees, and put them in political positions in the new government. Merger, or at least a common market with the Federation, was getting to be a possibility, and Lim Chin Siong broke with the PAP openly over Merger, pushing for an independent Singapore. LKY and the PAP openly said at the Hong Lim by-election that they did not believe in an Independent Singapore. The PLEN met with LKY and tried to persuade LKY to seek the abolition of the Internal Security Council. The PAP stated that in the constitutional talks, the PAP would seek Independence through Merger with the Federation. And so the split with the MCP was public.

TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER'S SEVENTH BROADCAST ON 27TH SEPTEMBER, 1961 AT 7.30 P.M.

Let me tell you how and why the British deliberately misled the Communists and manoeuvred their open-front workers into a false position.

In the Legislative Assembly meeting of July 20th, I recounted how Lim Chin Siong and his friends had been taken for a ride by the British. Over a period of several months at luncheons, cocktail parties, dinner parties and other social occasions, the UK Commission officials dropped hints to Lim Chin Siong and his friends and even generally to businessmen and sharebrokers, both local and British, giving everyone the impression that they considered Lim and his friends reasonable and sensible people. Slowly Lim and his friends were led to believe that if they were to obtain power by constitutional means, so long as the military bases were left untouched, the British would be quite happy to let them run this island.

LKY explained that he and the PAP were confused as to why the British would openly and generally express acceptance of the MCP, while at the same time pressing the local government (PAP) to take action against the communists. The PAP (LKY?) figured out that it was a ruse. For as long as the communists believed that the British was willing to treat them as any other political party with a legitimate route to power, they would behave themselves and conduct themselves as a legitimate political party.

LKY also explained the situation then. After the Hong Lim by-election where the PAP lost, the PAP wanted to resigned from government. The problem was that the by-election loss was because of unemployment, lack of housing, lack of social welfare, and other issues. The solution, as the PAP saw it was Merger and a common market with the Federation. This would bring economic growth, jobs, and investment. And with economic expansion the govt can then provide housing, and social welfare benefits.

BUT the Federation was unwilling to offer Merger or a common market because they were suspicious that the PAP and Singapore was sheltering communists.

There was no clear path to a solution and so the PAP wanted to resign from government. And the Communists did not want that. The PAP was the best chance at independent government, and if the PAP resigned, the communists were worried that what will take over would be a weak coalition government that the British could manipulate and purge the communists.

So the communists tried to get at least 26 PAP Assemblymen to carry on as PAP government.

Meanwhile Tunku Abdul Rahman for the first time mooted Merger as a possibility.

The communist thought that they had been played out, that all the while, PAP (and LKY) had been making secret arrangements with the Federation on Merger, and with Merger the central Malayan government would be in charge of security.

Why would the Communists prefer a British controlled Singapore without the Internal Security Council to a Singapore independent together with the rest of Malaya?

LKY covers that in his next broadcast.

TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER'S EIGHTH BROADCAST ON 29TH SEPTEMBER, 1961 AT 7.30 P.M.

I want to explain this paradox, that the Communists prefer Singapore still under British control but with the Internal Security Council abolished, rather than have a Singapore independent together with the rest of Malaya.

The most important reason why the Communists prefer a Singapore still under British control to independence, is that with the British in control, their struggle for a Communist Malaya can be camouflaged as an anti-colonial struggle. But if they continue their struggle in a Singapore which is already independent with the rest of Malaya, it is quite clearly a struggle not against colonialism, but against an independent elected government.

Also, LKY adds, for a communist to be detained by the British, they would be seen as martyrs. But if an independently elected national government were to take action against them, they would not be seen as nationalists or freedom fighters. Since the Federation (1957), the communists have been declining in strength and have been pushed into the jungles, and over the Thai border. As such, the communists wanted no Merger for Singapore as that would mean the Federation would root them out of Singapore, and as a separate Singapore, they would like the Internal Security Council to the abolished to allow the communists in Singapore the freedom to grow and operate.

The Barisan Sosialis was the only party in the Legislative Assembly to call for the abolition of the Internal Security Council, echoing the position of the Communists. The communists - Lim Chin Siong and Fong Swee Suan - tried to stir up the people against the Internal Security Council, arguing that the abolition of the Internal Security Council would solve all the problems of unemployment, housing, welfare, and economic growth.

LKY warned of the consequences of a Barisan Sosialis (communist) government in Singapore. So knowing the dangers, why did the PAP first work with these Communists? Second, knowing that they were up to no good, why didn't LKY take immediate steps to deal with them? LKY answers these two question in the next broadcast.

TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER'S NINTH BROADCAST ON OCTOBER 2, 1961 AT 7.30 P.M.

You may ask: If the Communists are such a danger to our society, why did we work with Lim and his Communist friends in one anti-colonial united front? This and other questions have to be answered. However uncomfortable the truth may be to me and my colleagues, you must know it.

I have told you how in 1953 we came to make our first Communist contact with Laniaz. 1953 was a time when the British in fighting the Communist insurrection also suppressed all nationalists who attacked them. The result was that all those who were anti-British either kept quiet, or quietly threw in their lot with the Communists underground to down the British.

LKY explained that in 1953, the British cracked down on all anti-British/anti-colonial organisations, communists and non-communists. "Legitimate" parties - such as the Progressive Party and the Labour Party - were mild, feeble, and "approved" by the colonial govt. They were "clowns and crooks passed off as leaders of people" according to LKY.

The PAP chose to work with the communists because a) they were both working to bring down the British, and b) the British made no distinction between a communist and a "nationalist". The downfall of the British was the immediate, short-term objective of both the communists and the nationalists. "Whether you wanted a democratic Malaya or a Communist Malaya, you had first to get rid of the British."

Well, knowing that eventually, the PAP and the Communists will have to go their separate ways, and the given a chance the communists will undermine or destroy the PAP, now that the PAP was in power, why didn't they take immediate steps to deal with the Communists?

Two answers: One if the PAP acted against the communists while the British were overall in charge, they could be perceived as being the stooges of the British. This happened to the Lim Yew Hock government in 1956. The communists framed the actions of the Lim Yew Hock government as instigated by the British, and the the Lim government was not truly independent. The PAP could also lose credibility if they acted against the communists while the British were still the supreme power (colonial masters).

Two, the communists were Chinese-educated. If the PAP acted against the communists, it could also be framed as the government acting against the Chinese-educated and attempting to suppress the Chinese culture and tradition. All the communists were Chinese-educated, but not all Chinese-educated were communists. The PAP had to act carefully so that their actions would not be construed as attempting to suppress or oppressed the Chinese-educated.

The communists realised that the PAP (or LKY) was not going to be manoeuvred, and it was the communists who were in a predicament. So they tried to bring down the government to prevent merger.

TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER'S TENTH BROADCAST ON OCTOBER 4, 1961, AT 7.30 P.M.

You will remember that the fight between the P.A.P. and the M.C.P. started after June 9th when we refused to agree to the Plen's call made through Lim Chin Siong for the abolition of the Internal Security in 1963. When we did not agree to their line to abolish the Internal Security Council, they persuaded a group of Assemblymen in the party to try and capture both the party and the Government and switch our non-Communist policy to a pro-Communist one. They used Dr. Lee Siew Choh as the front man of this group. Dr. Lee had told Dr. Goh and me that he was convinced that so long as the British bases were left untouched, it would be perfectly all right to run a pro-Communist Government with Communist support in Singapore. He said that the British were only interested in peace and stability and their bases.

LKY relates the horse-trading, deal-making, and manoeuvring by the communists to try to first, try to capture the PAP from within and take over the government with Dr Lee Siew Choh  as the new PM. The struggle was played out in the Anson By-election, where at the eve of Polls, 8 PAP Assemblymen betrayed the party, sowing confusion and doubt. PAP lost by 500 votes with 1500 abstentions.

LKY then tabled a "motion of confidence". The 8 assemblymen and 5 more who since aligned themselves to the communist would vote against the PAP government. The PAP survived the "no confidence" vote by just one vote, and the Assemblywoman who was brought from hospital was the deciding vote. She was "PAP member for Siglap Sahorah binte Ahmat, a plump Malay housewife who was then laid up in hospital".




TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER'S ELEVENTH BROADCAST ON OCTOBER 6, 1961, AT 7.30 P.M.

The original plan of the Communists to capture power in the Assembly by getting 26 Assemblymen and form the Government has failed. Their second plan to get 26 Opposition Assemblymen to vote the Government out has also failed.

Their third plan is now to make it so hot and uncomfortable for the Government all round that we shall quit before merger is accomplished. We shall be patient and forebearing and we shall see merger through.

This talk covers the manoeuvring of the communists as they tried to influence, control, or use the various unions to press the PAP government, and how the PAP managed to avoid being outflanked.

TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER'S TWELFTH BROADCAST ON OCTOBER 9TH, 1961, AT 7.30 P.M.

The original aim of the Communists was to call for an independent Singapore. I had told the Plen on 11th May that whatever he might say about deferring the question of separate independence for Singapore, his open front workers were loudly talking of immediate independence for Singapore alone. Their first step towards this end was to demand the abolition of the Internal Security Council in 1963. The logical second step would be independence. 

Once Singapore is independent, the Communists believe they could undermine the Federation, if necessary by force of arms. The possibility of Malaya being divided in open warfare between North vs. South is one which Communist policy was heading for. The Tengku is ready to counter this.

A drought in Singapore and Johore reminded the people that Independence for Singapore was unrealistic. And the communists abandoned their plan to push for that. Instead they proposed for "complete merger" like Penang, which would mean that there would be no Singapore Citizen, only Federation Citizenship. LKY explained the issues. Firstly, to qualify automatically for Federation Citizenship, the individual had to be born here. Only about half of the adult residents of Singapore would qualify. For those born elsewhere, they had to apply for citizenship and meet the criteria. One of which was to know/speak Malay. Hundreds of thousands of "Singaporeans" would be denied Federation citizenship.

Another tact by the communists was to propose independence for Singapore and Borneo first and discuss merger with the Federation later.

LKY noted that the communists response to this series of radio broadcast was to call them "smears" but he challenged them to dispute any of his facts specifically. He ended by returning to the need for Merger with the Federation for the survival of Singapore, and urging the people to support merger.